NALYSES o f world food prospects usually concentrate on the alleged limita tions of agricultural resources and rapid population growth. The likely ef fects of rapid income growth in the most populous parts of die world are generally neglected, as are die condnuing sharp decline in population growtii rates and price responses in terms of input or output substitution.
since 1950, while the world's population has grown by about 1.9 per cent a year. To put it another way: cereals output per person has increased by almost 1 per cent a year for over 40 years, when the world's population has been growing faster than ever before. Cereal yields alone have increased by 2.25 per cent a year since 1950: faster than the rate of population growth. The Food and Agriculture Organisation of die United Nations estimates that total food production has grown by 35.4 per cent per head over the 1961-96 period in high-income countries, and by 50.8 per cent in developing countries. Within developing-eountry regions, Asia experienced the largest increase (70.3 per cent), followed by Latin America (31.9 per cent). In Africa, food production per head fell by around 1 per cent a year over this 30-year period (FAOSTAT Database).
Within die populous Asian region, food producüon performances have been extraordinary. China increased food producüon per head by 165.7 per cent in the 1961-96 period as the result of rapid increases in food producüon, with a populaüon growdi of 1.8 per cent. Indonesia increased food producüon per head by 69.6 per cent, even diough its population grew at die reasonably rapid rate of 2.3 per cent. The increasing proportion of well-fed people in the world is largely due to the gains in Asia, where approximately 60 per cent of die world's population live. Af rica accounts for only 12 per cent of die global population, diough its share is in creasing because it now has die fastest growdi rate.
Waiting for Malthus

Beginning widi Thomas Malthus in his Essay on the Principle o f Population as it
Affects the Future Improvement o f Society in 1798, many commentators have been willing to foresee disaster in a looming imbalance between population and food growdi. More recendy, Ehrlich (1968) , for example, forecast starvation on a mas sive scale within die decade after die publication of his book, and urged strict population controls. Aldiough die expected disasters have not happened, in re cent years concern has again been rising, led in particular by Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute in die United States, about the allegedly adverse impact of population growdi and income growdi on soil, water and air: an impact diat is ex pected to severely damage die planet's food production capacity.
Faking an extremely pessimistic position on the spectrum of views on the world food oudook, Brown and Kane (1994) argue diat a shrinking backlog of unused agricultural technology is coinciding widi declining public interest in funding agricul tural research; diat die demands for water are pressing against hydrologic limits; dial die response of crops to additional fertiliser applications is declining in many coun tries; and that cropland is being substantially reduced by industrialisation and ur l Other well-known pessimists are Paddock and Paddock (1976) and Herman Daly (1980 Daly ( , 1996 . The modem anti-natal movement, which appears to have racist and eugenic roots, uses arguments about die adverse effects o f population growdi on economic growdi and environmental quality, even though there is no convincing evidence diat faster population growth in itself reduces income growdi, increases poverty or hastens environmental degradation.
banisation. Moreover, they believe that seafood production has reached its biologi cal limits and that the carrying capacity of rangelands has been exceeded -which places an additional burden on cropland to provide increased food supplies.
In another book which has created considerable anxiety in China, Brown (1995) advances a scenario wherein China's grain production declines from die 341m tons produced in 1990 to 272m tons by 2030, basically because of competi tion for agricultural land from industrial and urban uses. On the assumption that consumption per head does not increase, population growth is projected to raise total consumption from the 346m tons of 1990 to 479m tons by 2030; if China's consumption per head increases to 400 kilograms -about the same level as Tai wan's today and one-half that of the United States -total consumption will reach 641m tons by 2030. The former consumption scenario leads to grain imports of 207m tons by 2030, while die latter leads to grain imports of 370m tons. The first scenario envisages China importing the equivalent of today's global grain trade, while die second would nearly treble die global grain trade: an outcome which Brown sees as inconceivable.
Future Food Demand
In evaluadng diese and odier less pessimisdc forecasts of die world food oudook, attendon should be paid not only to die perceived constraints on die supply side but also to whedier reasonable judgments are being made about die future demand for food.
Alex McCalla, Director of die World Bank's Agriculture and Environment Department, has said diat:
Everyone agrees diat die world's populadon will exceed 8 billion people by 2025 ... everyone agrees diat world food supplies will have to more dian double by 2025, because of increases in income and urbanisadon in addidon to populadon growdi. Given diis widespread agreement on the needs or demand side of die equation and its magnitude ... why is diere so litde agreement on die ease or dilficulty of generadng die supply to meet diat demand? (McCalla, 1994:1) But is diis increase in demand so certain, even if we disregard die usual neglect of what might happen as a result of changes in food prices in die various scenarios? The demand for food is dependent on populadon size and on die effect of income changes on food demand; but populadon size becomes die more important deter minant as incomes increase. At very low income levels, 80-85 per cent of house hold income may be spent on food; so, as incomes increase from these low levels, food demand tends to grow very quickly. As incomes increase further, however, the marginal propensity to consume food falls. The consumption growth of die basic staple declines fastest. For example, die income elasdeity for rice in China is _ China's gram production achieved a record 500m tons in 1996. now believed to be negative (Ito et al., 1989; Peterson et al., 1991) . At the income levels of the high-income countries, consumption growth per head of food changes very little. The world's cereal consumption per head has not increased appreciably since 1978. In developing countries, the average has not increased since 1984. Given the rapid income growth achieved by a large proportion of the people in de veloping countries, the slowdown in consumption growth rates indicates that the most rapid phase of cereals consumption has already happened for most of the world's population. In developing countries which have experienced sustained in come growth, dietary patterns have shown significant changes, with shifts away from staple sources of calorie supplies, such as rice or maize, towards wheat, and from calorie sources to protein sources such as meats, fruits and vegetables (see Mitchell et al., 1997) . These dietary changes will continue as incomes rise, but die decline in die rate of growth of total food consumpdon per head can be expected to continue. In China, for example, real GDP grew substandally faster during die 1980s than during die 1970s, yet consumpdon of cereals grew by an average of 2.3 per cent a year during die 1980s compared widi 5.2 per cent a year during die 1970s.
As food consumpdon growth slows widi increasing incomes, populadon plays a more important role in food demand. But die populadon growth rate is also slow ing rapidly: from 2.06 per cent in 1965-70 to 1.74 per cent in 1985-90. The World Bank (1992) projected that it could fall to between 0.57 and 1.41 per cent by 2020-25: a wide range diat reflects die uncertainty surrounding populadon projecdons, mainly about the speed of die fertility slowdown in die demographic transidon (Bongaarts, 1995) . The reducdon in fertility has been comparadvcly rapid in die fast-growing East Asian countries. Presumably, if Sub-Saharan Africa could gener ate sustained economic growth, populadon growth there would slow faster dian de mographers are presendy forecasdng. Moreover, its food consumpdon would in crease faster than it has in recent decades, and dien slow. Under the World Bank's lowr populadon growth rate, the world populadon would reach 7.6 billion in 2025. The increase in die demand for food by 2025, as determined by populadon and income growth, is dierefore not as certain as McCalla assumes.
How Limiting are the Supply Constraints?
To meet future food demand, it appears diat supply will not need to increase as fast as it has over die past 40 years. But, as we have seen, some argue diat even a future rate of increase of around 1.7 per cent a year, as expected by die major forecasdng agencies, will be frustrated by resource constraints. How realisdc are die fears that Brown and Kane articulate?
Diminishing water supplies. It is widely agreed that achieving increases in water supplies does indeed pose problems, in terms of bodi the higher cost of addidonal supplies and the declining quality of existing supplies (Rosegrant, 1997; Rosegrant & Ringler, 1997) . Groundwater supplies are being depleted in many regions as pumping exceeds replenishment, and rapidly growing household and industrialisa tion uses compete with agricultural uses.
But water losses and wastage in agriculture are high because, as Rosegrant (1997) points out, water is often available free or at highly subsidised prices. However, raising die price of water to cover its true cost (private and social) is usu ally politically difficult. As well, property rights are often not well or easily defined, as in transborder (between provinces or countries) situations; and until such diffi culties are resolved water use will usually be inefficient. Developing the appropriate institutional mechanisms presents enormous challenges, particularly with regard to water resources shared among countries. But these challenges are being tackled, as exemplified in Australia by die formation of the Murray-Darling Basin Commission and die progress being made through the Commission in devising ways to share the basin waters more efficiendy and to reduce die basin's severe salinadon problem. An internadonal agreement has recendy been drawn up on sharing die waters of die Mekong River, and discussions are taking place over sharing the waters of the Jor dan and die Nile.
IjuhI availability and land degradation. Buringh and Dudal (1987) esdrnate diat less than one-half of die world's land area suitable for crop produedon is currcndy being used for diis purpose. Much of die presendy unculdvated area, however, is located in remote areas in Africa and Soudi America. World cropland has hardly increased since 1960, while land under pastures and meadows has increased by around 30 per cent since 1960. If yield increases can deliver the slower food pro duedon growdi likely to be needed in die future, die addidonal cropland require ments will be minimal. These projected increases in crops include die demands for feeding livestock, which implies slower increases in pasture areas. Crosson and Anderson (1992) argue diat die various reports on die loss of ar able land dirough erosion or chemical degradadon were exaggerated; indeed, die losses claimed run counter to die increased yields realised from these soils over sus tained periods. Rosegrant and Ringler (1997) agree. From his analysis of long-term data on soils in China and Indonesia, Lindert (1996) finds diat, of die important ingredients of soils, organic matter and nitrogen do appear to have declined on cul tivated lands in bodi countries, while total phosphorus and potassium have generally increased. Alkalinity and acidity have not worsened, nor has the topsoil layer be come thinner. Though China's soil organic matter and nitrogen have declined, its crop yields do not appear to have been adversely affected: presumably, Lindert ar gues, because nitrogen fertilisers have been applied. Lindert identifies three aspects of economic development which may result in improved soil quality. First, if we take all soil-farming feedbacks into account, the shift in food demand away from staples toward legumes and animal products is likely to replenish soil nutrients. Second, development brings cheaper capital and clearer property rights, which improve conservation. Third, urbanisation and indus trialisation raise the productivity of soils at the urban fringe.
In arguing that China's cereals production will fall well below its demand by 2030, Brown (1995) draws two parallels. First, in countries that, like China, began to industrialise when they were already densely populated (the examples he uses are Japan, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan), farmland was largely converted to industrial and urban uses. Second, most of the world's major fishing stocks have been se verely depleted because of the growth in population and incomes (particularly in Japan, where consumption of seafood products is comparatively high); in a similar fashion there will be a reduction in agricultural production in China because of over-use of agricultural land. But the logic of both arguments is faulty. If agricul tural land is converted to other uses in the absence of government intervention, the country's welfare is increased, and the rise in incomes earned in these other uses can be used to purchase (import) the needed agricultural products. Given its high incomes and low ratios of land to capital and land to labour, it was clearly in Japan's interests to specialise in non-agricultural products. And although its grain produc tion has fallen, Taiwan is a large exporter of other, more highly valued, agricultural products which it is better placed to produce than grains. As in Taiwan, China's comparative advantage in agricultural production is shifting away from land intensive crops such as grains towards more labour-intensive and higher-value crops such as fruit and vegetables (see Feng Lu, 1996) .
The depletion of fish and oilier marine-based stocks stems from the absence of effective property rights to marine resources and the consequent common access problem, resulting in over-exploitation (for discussion, see Iheduru, 1995; Williams, 1996) . But it is clear that, even with effective marine property rights and manage ment controls to ensure optimal harvest rates, the world's demands for seafoods cannot be met from unfarmed resources that allow no increases in productivity. Responding to the increasing prices of seafood products, the farming of fish and crustaceans has boomed, backed by scientific breakthroughs in breeding and farm ing methods.
The correct conclusion to draw with respect to Chinese agriculture, and agricul ture more generally, is that farmers must be given secure property rights to land so that farming can be efficient and sustainable. As well, if agricultural land becomes scarcer and its price rises, other means of farming involving land-substitution prac tices will be devised. But, unlike with seafoods, whose price increases triggered the search for other forms of production, there has been no sustained increase in prices of agricultural products signalling the need for a major increase in research effort. In fact, agricultural prices have continued to trend downwards in real terms, at least as measured in terms of wages.
The problem of farmers' insecure property rights to land needs to be addressed in many developing and transition countries where productivity growth is urgently required for enhanced food security. Discussions with W orld Bank staff stationed in Moscow suggest that the Russian Federation's poor recent agricultural perform ance is basically the result of the absence of long-term security of land tenure for individual farmers. By contrast, the extension of reasonably long-term access to land for individual farmers in China and Vietnam was a key reason, together with market-based prices, for die increase in dieir productivity (see McMillan et al., 1989) . In China, the original 15-year leases were extended for anodier 30 years in 1995. To allow scope for improved productivity dirough increased farm size, die leases should also be made transferable.
It is also clear diat, in many developing countries, more secure property rights to land -whedier freehold or long-term leasehold tenure -and cuts to the pun ishing taxes frequendy imposed on agriculture are needed to prevent furdier soil degradation and even to improve soil quality. In most cases, die most appropriate management of land and water resources will be achieved by insdtudonal develop ments (die creadon of property rights and of markets for trading in those rights) which internalise die external costs associated widi dieir use. This may well mean diat marginal land will no longer be farmed (or not farmed as intensively), or diat water use in agriculture will be reduced in response to higher prices. But, overall, resource allocation and social welfare will be improved. The impact of any conse quent reductions in resource use should be more dian offset by die improved pro ductivity from die institutional developments. More secure access to land and water should lead to greater investment in land, including investment diat promotes soil and water conservation, which in turn should lead to higher and more stable output.
Prospects for continued yield increases. The pessimists argue diat crop yields have slowed over die past decade or so, for reasons such as die declining response to increases in fertiliser applications, and slower developme nproved varieties. A different view, argued above, is diat yields do not need to grow as fast as in die past, because demand growdi is slowing. But how likely is it diat slower rates of cereals yield growdi, of around 1.5 per cent or even 2 per cent a year if required, can be achieved over die next 30-40 years?
Yield increases can be achieved eidier by extending die use of known technol ogy or by die development of new technology such as improved crop varieties, im proved fertilisers, or improved fanning practices. Large gaps between on-farm and experimental yields exist in many developing and transition economies due to the lack of application of existing technologies. Closure of diese gaps should be gready It is claimed that the secure access to use rights will reduce soil erosion and increase forest cover.
enhanced by improved institutions and policies, particularly more secure property rights to land, lower taxation of agriculture, and liberalisation of output and input (particularly fertiliser) markets. As well, there is ample room for improving the scope for yield-increasing new technologies as theoretical maximum yields -de termined by photosynthetic potential, land quality, length of growing season and water availability -are many times higher than actual yields on average (Plucknett, 1995) . The challenge is for research to provide the knowledge needed to reduce this gap.
Despite concern about the loss of biodiversity from developmental activities such as forest clearing, very substantial stocks of germplasm of die major food crops are held by research bodies in various countries (Wright, 1996) . Enough germplasm is available in storage banks, quite apart from what might be available in situ, to support future conventional plant breeding research and biotechnology applica tions. Research applying biotechnology techniques holds the potential to improve crop yields through introducing higher plant resistance to pests and diseases, higher tolerance to adverse weather (such as drought) or soil conditions (such as salinity) and improved responses to fertilisers. Plant breeding can thus substitute for declin ing availability of good quality arable land, just as research into soil nutrition can increase the availability of arable land (as it has in Australia).
Research in the improvement in fertiliser responsiveness should have a high pay-olf as levels of application of fertiliser in relatively favourable farming areas in Asia are now quite high and response rates appear to be slowing. Crop productivity can be raised without increased fertiliser use by improving nutrient uptake efficiency and nutrient balance (Rosegrant & Pingali, 1994) . Improved efficiency of fertiliser use is also needed to reduce the impact of fertiliser run-off on water supplies. This is a problem in Western Europe and parts of other high-income countries; but, ex cept for intensively cultivated areas of East Asia, developing countries use too little fertiliser, which reduces soil fertility and increases erosion (Rosegrant & Ringler, 1997) . This under-utilisation of fertiliser is often attributable to fertiliser import restrictions, which provide privileged interests with monopoly rents.
Conclusions
Concerns about an impending or even distant global imbalance between population growth and food supplies are exaggerated. The major problems in the food supply system are either man-made or can be corrected through institutional develop ments. Pessimistic commentators generally ignore the effect on food consumption growth rates of die substantial increases in incomes achieved by a large proportion of die people in die developing world. This, togcdier widi dieir rapidly slowing population growdi rates, means diat future growdi in cereals consumption will not be nearly as fast as it has been during die past 40 or so years -the period of most rapid growdi of the world's population. As a result, food supplies do not need to grow as fast as diey have in recent decades. Moreover, die concerns about future production growdi arc generally not warranted: or, if warranted, die causes and proposed solutions are misplaced.
Increasing water supplies will be difficult and costly; but much can be done to make die use of existing supplies more efficient. Water is too often unpriced to farmers; despite die polidcal difficulties, diis has to change. Sharing of water sup plies across countries also challenges policy-makers to devise insdtudons which achieve die most efficient utilisation of water supplies.
Establishing long-term, secure access to land for farmers is die most urgent need in many developing and transition countries and will make die greatest coutribution to their food security. Widi secure access, farmers are more willing to invest in die land and adopt improved technologies, leading to higher productivity and reduced soil loss and degradadon.
Besides market failure reflecdng die lack of appropriate property rights in land and water, extensive policy failures in many developing countries adversely affect agriculture dirough excessive taxadon of agricultural output, eidier direcdy or indirecdy (such as dirough over-valued exchange rates or import restricdons on fertilis ers). Again, reforming diese policies will be resisted by special interests, such as urban populadons diat enjoy subsidised food prices.
It is, of course, uncertain whether research can continue to generate die neces sary knowledge to keep yields increasing by extending die production capacity of land dirough substitution for natural resources. In a sense, land ceased to be a lim iting constraint in die post-World W ar II period as a result of scientific discoveries. In view of die base of scientific knowledge which has been established in die 20di century, diere are no grounds for pessimism about die potential for further scien tific discovery. While die scope for private agricultural research has increased widi die development of property rights in new technology, particularly biotechnology, diere remains an important role for government funding of national and interna tional research to increase agricultural productivity. But decisions about such funding should be based on objective analysis of die costs and benefits.
